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Abstract—Demand-side management (DSM) has emerged as
an important smart grid feature that allows utility companies to
maintain desirable grid loads. However, the success of DSM is
contingent on active customer participation. Indeed, most existing
DSM studies are based on game-theoretic models that assume
customers will act rationally and will voluntarily participate
in DSM. In contrast, in this paper, the impact of customers’
subjective behavior on each other’s DSM decisions is explicitly
accounted for. In particular, a noncooperative game is formulated
between grid customers in which each customer can decide on
whether to participate in DSM or not. In this game, customers
seek to minimize a cost function that reflects their total payment
for electricity. Unlike classical game-theoretic DSM studies which
assume that customers are rational in their decision-making, a
novel approach is proposed, based on the framework of prospect
theory (PT), to explicitly incorporate the impact of customer
behavior on DSM decisions. To solve the proposed game under
both conventional game theory and PT, a new algorithm based
on fictitious player is proposed using which the game will
reach an ǫ-mixed Nash equilibrium. Simulation results assess
the impact of customer behavior on demand-side management.
In particular, the overall participation level and grid load can
depend significantly on the rationality level of the players and
their risk aversion tendency.
Index Terms—Smart grid, game theory, prospect theory, de-
mand side management.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of demand-side management (DSM) mechanisms
has recently attracted significant attention in the smart grid
literature. DSM schemes offer smart grid customers an op-
portunity to change their demands over time so as to reduce
their overall electricity costs. From the utility company’s
perspective, such a shifting of demand can reduce the peak
hour demand on the grid [1]. A successful implementation
of DSM schemes requires customers to actively subscribe
to the offers made by the utility company. However, recent
empirical studies have shown that customers remain reluctant
to subscribe to DSM mechanisms, despite the efforts of utility
companies [2]. Therefore, it is important to develop a new
generation of DSM mechanisms that can improve the penetra-
tion of the technology and thus accelerate the deployment of
the smart grid.
There has been an abundant body of work dealing with
DSM [3]–[8]. The authors in [3] proposed a distributed, game-
theoretic DSM system, in which each user chooses a daily
schedule of household appliances and loads to optimize the
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energy consumption. The work in [4] proposed different game-
theoretic approaches to optimize a day-ahead DSM mechanism
by using storage units. The overall value of implementing
DSM and demand response schemes was studied in [5] via
a Stackelberg game formulation. The work in [6] investigated
how energy consumption may be optimized through a two-
step centralized model, in which a power supplier provided
consumers with an energy price parameter and consumption
summary vector. In [7], the authors adopted an instantaneous
load billing scheme so as to shift consumers’ peak hour de-
mand and to charge them fairly for their energy consumption.
In [8], utility companies and residential users were modeled
in two levels, which reduce demand variation and peak load.
Thus, the works in [3]–[8] study the various economic and
optimization aspects of DSM and are representative of the
majority of existing works in this area. However, most of
those existing works assume that customers will act rationally
and subscribe to DSM as long as their objective function can
be optimized [3]–[8]. In practice, as observed by numerous
real-world experimental studies [9]–[11], the process of in-
dividuals can deviate significantly from the rational premise
of conventional game theory. This has been corroborated by
the relatively low adoption rate of DSM in deployed smart
grids [2]. In this respect, prospect theory (PT), a Nobel-
prize winning theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky,
provides the necessary tools to better understand real-world
decision making and its deviation from rational behavior [12].
In particular, PT studies have shown that, in real life, users
often have subjective behavior when faced with uncertainty of
outcome, such as lottery outcomes. Also, it has been shown
that customers may have subjective perceptions on how others
behave and how this behavior impacts their gains or losses in
economic-oriented scenarios. Since the price in DSM strongly
depends on aggregate demands and thus on the participation
of all customers, the overall perceptions of the customers on
each other’s DSM decisions will impact their behavior. PT has
been widely used in the social sciences [13]. In addition some
recent works [14]–[17] have applied PT to wireless networks.
However, to the best of our knowledge, beyond our early
work in [18] that studies a two-player storage management
PT game, no existing work seems to have investigated how
PT considerations impact participation in DSM.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a new
framework for DSM that accounts for realistic customer partic-
ipation behavior using prospect theory. In particular, the DSM
problem is cast as a noncooperative game between customers.
In this game, each customer can decide whether or not to
2participate in a DSM program, while the utility company seeks
to reduce the total peak hour demand so as to maintain a
desirable target load on the grid. The proposed game uses PT
to explicitly incorporate the customers’ subjective perceptions
on DSM decisions and their impact on potential cost savings.
Here, subjective perceptions pertain to the way in which
each customer evaluates its electricity payment and how that
depends on other customers’ actions. In this respect, each
customer is seeking to minimize a cost function that reflects
its one-day electricity bill, under other customers’ participation
and its impact on the price.
Compared to related works on DSM [3]–[8], [19]–[23],
this paper brings forward novel ideas from PT in order to
explicitly account for realistic customer behavior, which can
differ significantly from the classical, rational path predicted
by traditional game theory. To solve the game, under both
PT and classical game theory, we propose a new learning
algorithm that allows the customers to interact and reach an
ǫ-mixed Nash equilibrium. We prove the convergence of the
algorithm and discuss the properties of the reached operating
point. Extensive simulation results based on realistic data show
that deviations from rational behavior can strongly impact the
overall level of participation in DSM.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II presents the studied system model. In Section III, we
formulate the problem as a PT-based game. In Section IV,
we introduce the concept of fictitious play and describe
our proposed algorithm. Simulation results are presented in
Section V, while conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Demand cost
Consider a smart grid consisting of a set N of customers
in which each customer i ∈ N consumes a certain amount
of energy per hour. All customers are offered the opportunity
to participate in a demand side management scheme provided
by the utility company. For customer i, we define an hourly
energy demand scheduling vector in line with existing works
such as,
xi = [x
1
i , x
2
i , . . . , x
H
i ], (1)
where H = 24 hours. For a certain hour h ∈ H =
{1, 2, . . . , H}, xhi represents the energy demand of customer
i. The total energy demand from all customers at time h is
thus
dh =
∑
i∈N
xhi . (2)
At a given time h, we assume that the price per energy unit
charged to a customer i is dependent on its fraction of the
total current load as follows [24]:
chi (x) = B
xhi∑
i∈N x
h
i
, (3)
where B could be designed based on notions from a locational
marginal pricing (LMP) scheme [25] in which the price
function is not necessarily time-dependent. The electricity
price for each customer as given by (3) allows one to allocate
the price for the amount of energy that a customer consumes.
For example, as the number of customers increases, the total
demand will increase. Then, the electricity pricing must reflect
this change in the demand. For each customer, the individual
electricity pricing is dependent on its demand proportion as
captured by (3). Hence, the total cost of user i over H hours
is given by
H∑
h=1
chi (x)x
h
i . (4)
Given the price and local demand, an energy market is set
up in which all customers seek to minimize their costs while
maintaining their energy demands at a desired level. Here,
all customers will interact so as to determine their demands
under DSM. These demands include the quantities of energy
required and impact the price at a certain time. Instead of
fixed reservation prices announced by a utility company, in
our model, each user can strategically change its demand, in
which its demand fraction of the total demand impacts the
underlying electricity price. In this respect, the price in (3) can
lead to an increased cost for all customers, including those that
decide not to participate in load management. Moreover, the
demand delayed by DSM will cause a varying electricity price
in subsequent hours. Thus, we will develop a DSM mechanism
based on load shifting.
B. Load Management
In this subsection, we propose a load shifting mechanism
to analyze the variations of the demand over time. Inherently,
load shifting allows part of the peak hour load to be moved to
an off-peak hour, in which such controlled demand is delayed
to the following time slot in our formulation. For the proposed
model, we assume that, for each participating customer, the
demand can be adjusted so as to meet a predefined/target
energy demand profile (vector) set by the utility company,
given by
Gd = [g
1
d, g
2
d, . . . , g
H
d ]. (5)
On the one hand, a utility company wants to reduce peak
hour demand in order to decrease load on the grid. On the
other hand, the company wants to maintain the amount of load
shifted within a reasonable range while avoiding the creation
of a new peak hour. For example, if the power company wants
to reduce 10% of the load at a given hour Hˆ, the target energy
demand could be defined by
ghd =
{
gh, if h 6= Hˆ,
βgh, if h = Hˆ,
(6)
where β = 0.9 and gh ∈ [g1, g2, . . . , gH ] can be the historical
demand referenced by the utility company. Here, we assume
that a customer can determine when it starts to participate in
DSM. In this respect, customer i will choose its starting time
(defined as the participating time ai) so as to minimize its cost
by observing the difference between the predefined demand
per user and its daily demand. In particular, we assume that a
customer i would not leave DSM after choosing to participate
over H = 24 hours and thus, the number of participating
customers at a given time h is Ih , |Ih| = |{ai ≥ h}|.
Here, ai is the starting hour and we discuss its impact in
3more detail in Section III-A. In this case, the reduced demand
of participating customer i is given by
rhi =
{
γi(x
h
i −
gh
d
−∑
i∈N\I x
h
i
Ih
)+, if ghd < lh,
0, if ghd ≥ lh,
(7)
where (q)+ := max(0, q) and lh is the total demand that
includes both dh and the amount shifted from the previous
hour h− 1, such that lh = dh +∑i∈N rh−1i . 0 < γi ≤ 1 is a
factor by which customer i wants to reduce from exceeding its
demand, as g
h
d
−∑
i∈N\I x
h
i
Ih
is the averaged demand suggested
by the utility company for all participating customers. In
particular, if the demand of participating customer i is less
than the average demand for participating customers, i.e.,
xhi <
gh
d
−∑
i∈N\I x
h
i
Ih
, its reduced demand is rhi = γi · 0 = 0.
Using (7), if customer i participates in DSM at time h, its
demand will be
yhi = x
h
i − rhi . (8)
Then, the participating customer i moves its shifted load to the
following hour, and thus, its DSM demand at time h < t < H
is
yti = (x
t
i + r
t−1
i )− rti , (9)
while the demand at the final hour H is
yHi = x
H
i + r
H−1
i . (10)
To analyze such a load management scheme, we next
propose a new framework that builds on the analytical tools
of classical game theory and prospect theory.
III. GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATION FOR DEMAND-SIDE
MANAGEMENT
In this section, we first formulate a noncooperative game
between the customers, and then study the proposed load
shifting model using expected utility theory [26] and prospect
theory [12], also discussing their various properties.
A. Noncooperative Game Model
In order to analyze the interactions between customers, we
use noncooperative game theory [26], as the strategy choices
of the customers are interdependent. We formulate a strategic
noncooperative DSM game Ξ = (N , {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ),
where N is the set of players, the action ai ∈ Ai :=
{1, 2, . . . , H} of customer i is the time (hour) at which cus-
tomer i would like to begin participation in DSM, and the cost
function ui of customer i captures its electricity payment to the
company, using the price in (3). Here, we note that, although
a customer can participate in load management, its total daily
demand remains the same (i.e., ∑Hh=1 xti = ∑Hh=1 yti ). Thus,
the utility function (cost) for a player i ∈ N that chooses an
action ai is given by
ui(ai,a−i) =
H∑
h=1
chi
(∑
i∈N
yhi (ai,a−i)
)
× yhi (ai,a−i),
(11)
where a−i = [a1, a2, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aN ]T is the vector
of action choices of all players other than i, and yhi (ai,a−i) is
the DSM demand of user i, compared to the initial demand xhi
in (1). For example, each customer can determine a starting
hour ai and shift its load to after that hour.
The goal of each customer i is to choose a strategy ai ∈ Ai
so as to minimize its cost as given in (11). For characterizing
a desirable outcome for the studied game Ξ, one must derive
a common solution that enables one to capture the coupling
between the individual optimization of each customer. We
define a = (ai,a−i) as the vector of all players’ strategies. For
each such vector a, we will have a different electricity price
chi (·) in (3). Prior to finding a solution for the proposed DSM
game, we will introduce expected utility theory and prospect
theory.
B. Expected Utility Theory (EUT)
In a smart grid, as the customers may, over a long time
period, change their DSM preferences, we are interested in
studying the frequency with which they choose a certain
time to begin DSM participation. Therefore, we mainly study
the proposed game under mixed strategies [26] so as to
capture the customers long-term, probabilistic choices of a
DSM start time. Let p = [p1, . . . ,pN ] be the vector of
all mixed strategies, where, for every customer i ∈ N , we
have pi = [pi(1), . . . , pi(H)]T and pi(ai) is the probability
corresponding to the choice of a pure strategy ai ∈ Ai.
Under the conventional EUT model, the expected cost of
customer i is captured via the expected value over its mixed
strategy. Computing each user’s utility requires the vector of
all players’ strategies. In particular, we assume that the smart
grid communication infrastructure will make this information
available to users who participate in DSM. Thus, the EUT cost
of a player i will be given by
UEUTi (p) =
∑
a∈A
( N∏
l=1
pl(al)
)
ui(ai,a−i), (12)
where a is the vector of all players’ strategies and A =
A1 × A2 × · · · × AN . In particular, the mixed-strategy
p(h) = [pi(h),p−i(h)]
T represents the empirical frequencies
with which the customers choose a certain participation time
h. These frequencies capture how often customer i participates
in DSM. p−i(h) is the vector of mixed strategies of all players
other than i, corresponding to a−i in (11).
C. Prospect Theory
As previously mentioned, a player can evaluate its expected
utility by using (12), in which case the customers are assumed
to act rationally and objectively under EUT. However, in real
life, individuals do not truly behave rationally nor do they trust
the rationality of others’ behavior. Thus, in order to develop a
realistic model of DSM, one must account for the fact that, in
practice, customers may not assess their utilities objectively.
Indeed, it has been shown that, despite the benefits of DSM,
its adoption in practice has remained slow, due to unexpected
customer behavior [2].
To study such realistic/practical participation models, we
will develop a DSM game model, in which a customer may
have subjective views on how the opposing players will choose
4their strategies. This, in turn, impacts the way in which this
customer evaluates its utility in (11) which depends on other
customers’ strategies. Indeed, it has been observed that in
real-life decision-making, people tend to subjectively weight
uncertain outcomes [27]. Uncertainty, here, is defined as the
fact that the amount of utility that a customer will obtain,
depends on the decision making behavior of other customers,
which is probabilistic. For example, a customer cannot be
sure of the time at which other customers will begin their
participation in DSM. Thus, the customer will not be sure
how much economic gain its participation in DSM will yield;
since such a participation depends on all the players’ strategies.
Thus, this customer’s EUT evaluation as per (12) might be
overweighted or underweighted due to the subjective observa-
tion of others. Moreover, this customer may need to properly
assess whether to shift its demand or not, as it is unsure of
other customers’ strategies. In this respect, a customer might
have its own subjective perception on the participation of other
customers in the DSM game (and on the actual price), thus
deviating from the rational assumption of conventional game
theory and EUT.
In order to analyze such subjective perceptions, we will
use the behavioral framework of prospect theory [12]. In this
studied model, we mainly focus on how a customer evaluates
the strategies of its opponents and, thus, acts accordingly. Our
focus is on the prospect-theoretic perspective, which primarily
deals with how human decision makers deal with economic
outcomes that have some form of uncertainty.
One important PT concept is the so-called weighting effect.
Weighting effect naturally implies that customers will have
subjective views on how their opponents will act (i.e., a
weighted view on the probability vector of those players),
which, in turn, maps to subjective views on their expected
utilities. In the proposed game, we use this weighting effect to
incorporate a subjective evaluation for each user’s observation
of the mixed strategy of its opponents. Thus, under PT, instead
of objectively observing the mixed strategy vector p
−i chosen
by the other players, each user perceives a weighted version
of it, wi(p−i). wi(·) is a nonlinear transformation that maps
an objective probability to a subjective one. PT studies have
shown that most people will often overweight low probability
outcomes and underweight high probability outcomes [12].
Without loss of generality, we assume that all players use a
similar weighting approach, such that wi(·) = w(·), ∀i ∈ N .
Although many weighting functions exist, we choose the
widely used Prelec function (for a given probability σ) [27],
w(σ) = exp(−(− lnσ)α), 0 < α ≤ 1, (13)
where α is a parameter used to characterize the distortion
between subjective and objective probability. Note that when
α = 1, the weighting effect will coincide with the conventional
EUT probability. Fig. 1 illustrates the probability weighting
effect. In this figure, we can see that the objective probability
and subjective estimation insect at p = 1/e and the curve
approximates EUT as α increases. Also, weighted summations
are not necessarily equal to 1 (i.e., w(0.4) + w(0.6) < 1).
Under PT, the expected utility achieved by a player i, given
the weighting effect, is
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Fig. 1. The subjective probability under the weighting effect, as the objective
probability varies.
UPTi (p) =
∑
a∈A
(
pi(ai)
N∏
l∈N\{i}
w(pl(al))
)
ui(ai,a−i). (14)
Here, we assume that a player has a subjective evaluation
only of the other players’ strategy probabilities. In this respect,
customer i’s subjective evaluation of its own probability is
equal to its objective probability.
Having defined the cost functions under both EUT and PT,
our next goal is to find a solution for the game. Given the set
of probability distributions Pi over its set of strategies Ai, a
suitable solution of the game would be a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium defined as follows:
Definition 1: A mixed strategy profile p∗ ∈ P =∏Ni=1 Pi
is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) if, for each cus-
tomer i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, we have (Ui represents UEUTi and
UPTi under EUT and PT, respectively)
Ui(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) ≤ Ui(pi,p∗−i), ∀pi ∈ Pi. (15)
In practice, to avoid slow convergence times and unnecessary
overhead, we can consider approximate equilibrium solutions
that allow the players to reach the neighborhood of an equi-
librium. Hence, we mainly focus on ǫ-Nash equilibria which
are defined as follows:
Definition 2: A mixed strategy profile p∗ ∈ P =∏Ni=1 Pi
is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE) if, for every player i, we have
Ui(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) ≤ Ui(pi,p∗−i) + ǫ, ∀pi ∈ Pi, (16)
where ǫ is a small positive number.
In order to find the solution for the game Ξ under both
EUT and PT, we find a mixed ǫ-NE in strategic form which
represents a point within a close neighborhood of the exact
equilibrium [26].
IV. GAME SOLUTION AND ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a novel algorithm, under both
EUT and PT, to solve the studied DSM game and find an
equilibrium point. The proposed algorithm builds on classical
fictitious play (FP) [28]. Thus, we propose the following iter-
ative algorithm to find an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the proposed
game:
p
(k+1)
i = p
(k)
i +
λ
k + 1
(v
(k)
i − p(k)i ), (17)
5where 0 < λ < 1 is an inertia weight, k is the iteration index,
and v(k)i = [v
(k)
i (a1), v
(k)
i (a2), . . . , v
(k)
i (aH)]
T is a vector of
player i’s strategies such that, v(k)i (al) = 1 if player i chooses
the lth strategy at iteration k and v(k)i (al) = 0 for updating
the strategies excluding the lth strategy. The pure strategy i.e.,
the lth strategy, is the one that minimizes the expected utility
with respect to the updated empirical frequencies. Thus, player
i can repeatedly choose its strategy and update v(k)i as follows:
v
(k)
i (a
(k)
l )=
{
1, if a(k)l =arg min
ai∈Ai
ui(ai,p
(k−1)
−i ),
0, otherwise,
(18)
where the utility here is the expected value obtained by
player i with respect to the mixed strategy of the opponent,
when player i chooses pure strategy al for EUT and its
weighted mixed strategy w(pl(al)) for PT. It is well known
that our algorithm (as a simplified iterative approach of smooth
fictitious play (SFP)) is guaranteed to converge to a mixed ǫ-
Nash equilibrium [29], as the players’ beliefs (probabilistic
choices) converge to a fixed point. In particular, a player’s
belief is its mixed strategy set, and ǫ represents the utility
difference based on beliefs. Here, we define ǫp as the mixed
strategy difference corresponding to the utility. SFP can reach
an ǫ-NE under EUT, in which the belief difference ǫp between
two iterations is small when the number of iterations k goes
to infinity. However, to our knowledge, such a result has not
been extended to PT. Here, we first prove that the proposed
algorithm in (17) will converge to a fixed point in beliefs, as
follows:
Theorem 1: There exists an inertia weight λ, 0 < λ < 1,
such that the iterative algorithm in (17) converges to a fixed
point in belief, as a mixed ǫp-equilibrium (ǫp ≤
√
2
k+1 ).
Proof: For the proposed DSM game, the proposed SFP
process is guaranteed to converge to a fixed point in be-
liefs [29] under EUT. Here, we mainly prove that, under PT,
a player i’s iterative sequence {pi(k)} converges to a mixed
ǫp-equilibrium in beliefs. From (17), we have
p
(k+1)
i =
(
1− λ
k + 1
)
p
(k)
i +
λ
k + 1
v
(k)
i
=
(
1− 1
k + 1
)
p
(k)
i +
1
k + 1
v
(k)
i +
1− λ
k + 1
p
(k)
i
− 1− λ
k + 1
v
(k)
i ,
(19)
where the first two terms represent the iteration using FP [28]
and, we define
ǫp =
∣∣∣∣1− λk + 1p(k)i − 1− λk + 1v(k)i
∣∣∣∣. (20)
In (19) and (20), we present the belief difference between
the proposed algorithm and FP, where there exists an ǫp
difference at the kth iteration. In particular, the distance
boundary between FP belief and the approached belief can
be bounded as follows:
ǫp =
1− λ
k + 1
|(p(k)i − v(k)i )| ≤
1− λ
k + 1
·
√
2, (21)
where ǫp becomes small as k increases. Indeed, the Euclidean
distance in (21) involves v(k)i in (18), one of whose compo-
nents is 1, and the mixed strategy set p(k)i , whose components
will sum to 1. Thus, the maximum Euclidean distance between
p
(k)
i and v
(k)
i is less than
√
2
k+1 at the kth iteration.
Within the given boundary, (19) can be rewritten as
p
(k+1)
i =
(
1− λ
k + 1
)
p
(k)
i +
λ
k + 1
v
(k)
i
=
(
1− λ
k + 1
)(
1− λ
k
)
p
(k−1)
i +
λ
k + 1
v
(k)
i
+
(
1− λ
k + 1
)
λ
k
v
(k−1)
i
= · · ·
=
(
1− λ
k + 1
)(
1− λ
k
)
· · ·
(
1− λ
2
)
p
(1)
i
+
λ
k + 1
v
(k)
i +
(
1− λ
k + 1
)
λ
k
v
(k−1)
i + · · ·
+
( k∏
j=2
(
1− λ
j + 1
))λ
2
v
(1)
i .
(22)
The first term in (22) is
(∏k=+∞
k=1 (1 − λk+1 )
)
p
(1)
i . Since∏k=+∞
k=1 (1 − λk+1 ) is decreasing as k increases and bounded
by |p(1)i | ≤ 1, the first term is convergent as k goes to infinity.
In fact, this term converges to 0.
For the remaining terms in (22), we can define
hj =
(
1− λ
k + 1
)(
1− λ
k
)
· · ·
(
1− λ
j + 2
)
λ
j + 1
v
(j)
i
=
(∏
j≤k
(
1− λ
j + 2
)) λ
j + 1
v
(j)
i .
(23)
Similarly, since |hj| is decreasing as k increases and bounded
by |v(j)i | = 1,
∑k
j=1 hj is convergent as k goes to infinity.
Thus, we conclude that, p(k+1)i will converge to a fixed point,
as a mixed ǫp-equilibrium in beliefs using (17).
Remark 1: When λ = 1, the proposed algorithm in (19) is
reduced to FP. Hence (19) and (22) can be derived as p(k+1)i =
1
k+1p
(1)
i +
1
k+1 (v
(k)
i + · · · + v(1)i ). Thus, FP (λ = 1) might
cycle if v(k)i repeats after some iteration, i.e., v
(2)
i = v
(4)
i =
v
(6)
i = · · · , and v(1)i = v(3)i = v(5)i = · · · , while the proposed
algorithm (0 < λ < 1) in (17) converges to a fixed point.
Theorem 2: For the proposed DSM game, the proposed
algorithm in (17) is guaranteed to converge to a mixed ǫ-NE
under both EUT and PT, as its beliefs converge to a mixed
ǫp-equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the appendix.
We summarize the proposed DSM solution in Table I. To
find the solution of this game under both EUT and PT, we
use the algorithm in (17) to solve for the mixed ǫ-NE. In the
first phase of the algorithm, each customer will set an initial
probability vector, while any non-participating customers will
set its probability to 0 throughout the whole DSM process. At
the beginning, each participating customer observes others’
strategies and evaluates its expected costs of every strategy.
In the evaluation process, a participating customer can receive
an estimate of the expected costs from the grid operator under
6TABLE I
PROPOSED LOAD SHIFTING SOLUTION
Phase 1 - Proposed Dynamics:
Each customer i ∈ N chooses a starting strategy pinit
i
as its mixed
strategy of participation.
repeat,
1) Each customer i ∈ N observes others’ participation p
−i
2) Each customer i∈N updates its better response strategy using
the proposed algorithm in (17):
i) The utility operator communicates with the customer
using the grid’s two-way architecture communication
(see [30] or [1] and references therein).
ii) Customers’ loads can be shifted via DSM as in Section II-B.
Load Shedding
a) The utility operator advertises all customers’ participation
times ai ∈ Ai using their mixed strategies.
b) Each customer publishes its participation pPT
i
based on a
mixed strategy pEUT, representing the subjective observation
with underlying weight effect.
c) After combining probabilities as in (12), customer i will
receive an expected cost under EUT, sent by the operator,
and observe the current vector of strategies p
−i
so as to
assess its subjective utility in (14) under PT.
d) Customer i chooses its strategic response in (17).
until convergence to a mixed NE strategy vector p∗.
Phase 2 - Power Company Strategy
1) The operator receives the participation information
given the mixed strategy set as per a∗.
2) Actual load shifting is implemented under realistic participation.
EUT, since the grid operator objectively collects information
and provides required services/information. Then, the cus-
tomers will overweight or underweight the information about
others’ strategies based on the individual weighting effect in
(13). Moreover, each customer will subjectively estimate its
expected costs of every strategy and then frequently report its
participation based on its mixed strategy. The communication
between customers and grid operator will continue until the
expected costs satisfy the setting ǫ in utility (12), (14) and (16).
Once a mixed ǫ-NE is reached, the customers will frequently
signal their participation decisions based on probabilities and
participate in demand-side management in Phase 2. This phase
of the proposed load shifting solution is the practical market
operation. Given the submitted information, the grid operator
will shift/reduce local loads. The actual process of Phase 2
is beyond the scope of this paper and will follow real-world
contract negotiations that could be interesting to study in future
work.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we use the real-world load profile
in [31] which represents customers’ initial demands, i.e., the
data between April 29th, 2013, and May 4th, 2013, from
Miami International Airport, since the data of local customer
houses, or groups, is large, private and confidential. In all
simulations, each customer can choose a starting time to
participate in DSM from the time period between 18:00 and
20:00. Alternatively, the customer can decide not to partic-
ipate; that is, Ai = {18, 19, 20, 24}, ∀i ∈ N . Also, we set
β = 0.86 and γ = 0.6 for all customers.
Fig. 2 shows, for a smart grid with six customers, all
mixed strategies of a selected Customer 1 under both EUT
and PT. In this figure, we choose α = 0.7 for all customers
to represent their distortion under the weighting effect in
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Fig. 2. The probability performance of all mixed strategic participations for
Customer 1 under both EUT and PT.
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Fig. 3. The mixed strategic participations for the six customers using both
EUT and PT at 19:00.
(13). Clearly, Customer 1’s PT strategy is different than its
EUT strategy. Compared to the EUT results (solid lines),
the PT participating strategy (dash line) at 20:00 is larger,
while the other PT mixed strategies are smaller. In essence,
we observe that PT generally enhances (reduces) high (low)
frequency EUT strategies. For instance, under EUT, Customer
1 will have the highest participation strategy at 20:00 due
to load shifting as per (7) and the varying price in (3).
In particular, its largest mixed strategy is greater than the
average mixed strategy, i.e., 0.25 in the proposed four-strategy
game. Second, because of the weighting effect in (13), in
Fig. 2, we can see how PT behavior can be different from
EUT. In particular, we observe that a PT customer wants to
participate more than in the EUT case at times when it has a
low hourly energy prices in (3), which also corresponds to a
situation with high participation under EUT. In other words,
for minimizing its cost, under PT, each customer tends to
increase its participation at the hours with lower hourly prices
in (3) and to decrease its participation at the hours with higher
hourly prices. This is mainly due to the relationship between
shifting the demand and the resulting price as captured by
(3) and (11). Thus, under realistic behavioral considerations,
customers will accentuate the traditional behavior perceived
under EUT. This will consequently impact the overall DSM
performance as shown in the next figures. Accordingly, under
PT, we can observe that higher EUT probabilities will become
more pronounced. Thus, the largest mixed strategy using EUT,
7Fig. 4. The expected nonparticipating load for the six customer game under
mixed strategies using both EUT and PT over 24 hours, when all customers
have the same α = 0.7.
i.e., at 20:00, would be overweighted via PT observation, and
vice versa. This is due to the fact that each PT customer takes
a risk by participating when the hourly costs are low.
Fig. 3 shows, using the same parameters as Fig. 2, the
probability that each customer participates in DSM at 19:00
under both EUT and PT. In this figure, we can first see that the
mixed strategy of each customer using PT is different from that
resulting from EUT. Under EUT, the rational mixed strategies
made by some customers, such as Customers 3-6, are higher
than the average mixed strategy, because they have low costs at
19:00. In particular, given the price in (3), a customer’s lowest
demand between 18:00 and 20:00 would cause the lowest
costs and the highest participation. This implies that a rational
customer wants to participate in DSM when it does not require
a lot of energy (or its demand is low) in practice, since the
payment is low. Under PT, the customers’ realistic decisions
will impact the price in (3) and change their participation
levels. In Fig. 3, some customers’ mixed strategic components
using PT are greater than those of EUT, i.e., Customers 3-6,
while Customers 1 and 2 have a lower participation probability
using PT. If four PT customers, based on their loads between
18:00 and 24:00, decide to shift more load at 19:00, their
PT demands will be less than EUT. Then, compared to EUT,
the PT prices of Customers 1 and 2 will increase because of
the changing load fraction in (3). Because of the increasing
prices, Customers 1 and 2’s costs increase and they will be
less interested in participating at 19:00. Indeed, there will exist
some customers, such as Customers 1 and 2, who want to
decrease their participation at 19:00 under PT as shown in
Fig. 2. Then, the overall demand increases and Customers 3-6
obtain a decreasing pricing in (3) which will make these four
customers more likely to participate at 19:00.
Fig. 4 shows the expected nonparticipating load profile
in the proposed DSM game as time varies. We choose the
same customers as in Fig. 2 with the distortion parameters
are set to α = 0.7 for all customers. The actual demand
is the summation of initial demands in (2). In Fig. 4, the
nonparticipating load is the minimum expected load that the
power company must supply, while the participating load
represents the load that can be partly shifted based on each
individual customer’s action in (7). Here, all customers can
Fig. 5. The expected nonparticipating load for the six customer game under
mixed strategies using both EUT and PT over 24 hours, when customers have
different values of α.
start the game from 18:00 and the expected nonparticipating
loads between EUT and PT are different. On the one hand, the
difference between EUT and PT during 18:00 and 20:00 is due
to the change in the customers’ decisions, as previously shown
in Fig. 3. On the other hand, between 21:00 and 23:00, the
customers nonparticipating load using PT is always less than
that using EUT. Indeed, if we translate the proposed game into
a “participate or not participate” game, 21:00 can be used to
distinguish two such strategies, and customer behaviors before
21:00 can impact their participation at a later time. However,
the fact that the nonparticipation level for PT is less than that
for EUT after 21:00 directly relates to the choice of a distortion
parameter α. In particular, a small deviation from the rational
strategy for α = 0.7 leads to an increased competition between
the customers due to the fact that a weighted observation
increases the costs in (11). Such small deviation represents
a case in which a customer participates in DSM but does not
trust its view of the opponents’ strategy or the information
received from the power company. Thus, a slight deviation
from the rational path causes increasing costs and customers
are more apt to shift their loads under PT to decrease the
impact of being non-rational, compared to EUT. As a result,
after 21:00, as seen in Fig. 4, the PT nonparticipating load
will be less than that for EUT. At 24:00, the power company
needs to deal with the remaining load as defined in (10).
Compared to Fig. 4, Fig. 5 shows the expected nonpartic-
ipating load profile using different distortion parameters, as
time varies. The distortion parameter α in (13) allow us to
measure how a customer perceives the actions of its opponents.
A large α implies a small distortion, while a small α represents
an excessively subjective perception. In particular, we choose
α = [0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1]T . In this figure, we can see that,
when some customers have a very irrational observation of
their opponents, the PT nonparticipating load between 21:00
and 23:00 will be higher than EUT. This implies that, in
reality, if some customers deviate significantly from their
rational strategies (for example, a customer forgets to assist
the power company in load shifting), the power company
will not be able to shift the total load predicted by the
rational, objective model. Thus, the power company can use
the distortion parameter to decide on how to design its DSM
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Fig. 6. The expected nonparticipating load of all customers at 19:00 as α
varies.
scheme.
Fig. 6 shows the expected nonparticipating load at 19:00,
as the weighting effect parameter α varies. In this figure, we
can see that the expected nonparticipating load under EUT is
65.7% of the total load and, the nonparticipating load under
PT is less than EUT when α > 0.56. This is because the
majority of PT customers have more interest in participating
at 19:00, as shown in Fig. 3. Thus, the power company can
shift more load in practice, compared to EUT. Also, this figure
shows that there exists a distortion threshold, such that, if α
is greater (smaller) than the threshold, PT customers will have
lower (higher) nonparticipating loads than EUT cases. A large
distortion parameter, or a small deviation from EUT, yields an
increased competition thus raising the costs to the customers.
Consequently, the customers will become risk seeking and
more apt to shift their loads and decrease their costs. Thus, the
increasing PT costs will force the majority to shift more loads,
compared to EUT. However, a small distortion parameter, or
a large deviation from EUT, will lead to highly distorting
behavior from the customers which will lead to increasingly
high competition and decreasing participation, as customers
become extremely risk averse and unwilling to participate
in the DSM process. In a nutshell, Fig. 6 shows that a
small deviation from EUT may be beneficial for the power
company as it increases customers’ participation. In contrast,
a significant deviation from EUT will inevitably lead to highly
risk averse behavior which will prevent most customers from
participating; thus yielding detrimental results for the grid and
preventing the operator from reaping the benefits of DSM.
In Fig. 7, we show all PT mixed strategies of Customer 1
(corresponding to Fig. 2), as the number of iterations increases.
The proposed algorithm can be shown to converge sublinearly
by studying its rate of convergence which is defined as R =
lim
k→∞
|p(k+1)−p∗|
|p(k)−p∗| . Here, we mainly test the convergence of the
proposed algorithm in (17). In particular, Customer 1’s initial
probability is p(0)1 = [0.2500 0.3333 0.2083 0.2083]T and it
converges to p∗1 = [0.1110 0.1480 0.6484 0.0925]T . From
Fig. 2, due to the low hourly costs, Customer 1 will increase
its participation at 20:00, corresponding to the highest EUT
frequency. In Fig. 7, since the initial probability at 20:00 is
small, i.e., p(0)1 (a3) = 0.2083, Customer 1 will choose its best
strategy and update v1(a3) = 1 in (18). Thus, we can see that
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Fig. 7. The probability performance of mixed strategy for six customers based
on EUT and PT.
TABLE II
CUSTOMER 1’S ALL MIXED ǫ-NE UNDER BOTH EUT AND PT
EUT PT
1 [0.1667 0.2222 0.4722 0.1389]T [0.1110 0.1480 0.6484 0.0925]T
2 [0.2667 0.1333 0.5333 0.0667]T [0.1776 0.0888 0.6891 0.0444]T
3 [0.0392 0.1569 0.4509 0.3530]T [0.0261 0.1045 0.6343 0.2351]T
4 [0.1159 0.2609 0.5072 0.1159]T [0.0772 0.1738 0.6718 0.0772]T
5 [0.2222 0.0889 0.4666 0.2222]T [0.1480 0.0592 0.6447 0.1480]T
the participating probability at 20:00 increases, as the iteration
k increases. Similarly, because of the large initial probabili-
ties at other strategies, Customer 1 will decrease underlying
participation via updating v1(a1) = v1(a2) = v1(a4) = 0 in
(18). Also, Table II shows Customer 1’s all mixed ǫ-Nash
equilibria under both EUT and PT. Using different initial
probability vectors p(0), the proposed algorithm in (17) will
reach different Nash equilibria, and the differences between
EUT and PT at two different Nash equilibria are not the same.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a novel approach for
studying the problem of demand-side management. It is of
interest to factor in explicitly the behavior of customers in
DSM. In particular, we have developed a game-theoretic
approach, based on prospect theory, using which each player
subjectively observes other players’ actions and determines its
own actions so as to minimize a cost function that captures
the electricity cost over 24 hours. Then, we have proposed
an algorithm and have proved that it reaches a mixed ǫ-NE.
Simulation results have shown that deviations from classi-
cal, objective game-theoretic DSM mechanisms can lead to
unexpected results and loads on the grid, depending on the
level of the customers’ subjective perceptions of each others’
actions. Therefore, whether a customer participates in DSM
or not, depends on this level of rationality of the customer. In
a nutshell, the results of this paper have provided important
insights into the factors underlying the modest participation in
DSM schemes observed in real-world smart grid systems.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: The convergence of the beliefs to a mixed ǫp-
equilibrium is shown in Theorem 1. Based on Theorem 1, the
convergence of a mixed ǫ-NE under EUT is a known result
9for SFP in [29]. The following proof mainly focuses on PT
and we prove this theorem by contradiction.
Suppose that {pk} is an iterative process resulting from
the proposed algorithm that converges to a mixed strategy p∗
(an ǫp equilibrium) after k iterations. Also, assume a mixed
NE δ∗ = {δ∗i , δ∗−i} is near to the fixed point p∗. Based on
contradiction, if the point p∗ = {p∗i ,p∗−i} is not an ǫ-mixed
NE, there must exists a strategy p′i(a′i) ∈ p∗i , such that 1)
pi(ai) > 0, pi(ai) ∈ p∗ (at least one mixed strategy of player
i is not zero), and 2)
uPTi
(
ai,p
∗
−i
)
>uPTi
(
a′i,p
∗
−i
)
,
uPTi
(
ai, δ
∗
−i
)
+ ǫi
(
ai, δ
∗
−i
)
>uPTi
(
a′i, δ
∗
−i
)
+ ǫi
(
a′i, δ
∗
−i
)
,
where ui(ai,p∗−i) is the expected utility of pure strategy ai
and ǫi(ai, δ∗−i) is the utility difference between NE and ǫ-
NE. Here, since the iterative mixed strategy decreases as the
number of iterations n increases (n ≤ k), the utility distance
ǫs of a pure strategy between two neighboring iterations/steps
must be less than a value after a certain iteration k. In
particular, if the proposed algorithm converge to a fixed ǫp
equilibrium at iteration k and it is not an ǫ-NE in belief
(utility), we can find an ǫs, such that
0 < ǫs <
1
2
∣∣∣∣uPTi (ai,p∗−i)− uPTi (a′i,p∗−i)
∣∣∣∣,
0 < 2ǫs <
(
uPTi (ai, δ
∗
−i) + ǫi(ai, δ
∗
−i)
)
−
(
uPTi (a
′
i, δ
∗
−i) + ǫi(a
′
i, δ
∗
−i)
)
,
where uPTi (ai, δ
∗
−i) =
∑
a∈A ui(ai,a
∗
−i)wi(δ
∗
−i). For n ≥ k,
the proposed algorithm process satisfies
uPTi (ai,p
n
−i) =
∑
a∈A
ui(ai,a
n
−i)wi(p
n
−i)
≥
(∑
a∈A
ui(ai,a
∗
−i)wi(p
∗
−i)
)
− ǫs
=
(∑
a∈A
ui(ai,a
∗
−i)wi(δ
∗
−i)
)
+ ǫi(ai, δ
∗
−i)− ǫs
>
(∑
a∈A
ui(a
′
i,a
∗
−i)wi(δ
∗
−i)
)
+ ǫi(a
′
i, δ
∗
−i) + ǫs
=
(∑
a∈A
ui(a
′
i,a
∗
−i)wi(δ
∗
−i)
)
+ ǫs
≥
∑
a∈A
ui(a
′
i,a
n
−i)wi(p
n
−i)
= uPTi (a
′
i,p
n
−i).
Thus, player i would not play ai but a′i after the nth iteration,
and we will have pi(ai) = 0 and w−i(pi(ai)) = 0 (the
other player’s observation on pi). Here, we have proved that,
pi(ai) = 0 contradicts the initial assumption pi(ai) > 0; thus
the theorem follows.
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